Memory consequences of looking back to notice change: Retroactive and proactive facilitation by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Wahlheim, Chris
Memory consequences of looking back to notice change: Retroactive and proactive 
facilitation 
By: Larry L. Jacoby, Christopher N. Wahlheim, Colleen M. Kelley 
Jacoby, L. L., Wahlheim, C. N., & Kelley, C. (2015). Memory consequences of looking back to 
notice change: Retroactive and proactive facilitation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 41(5), 1282-1297. doi:10.1037/xlm0000123 
©American Psychological Association, [Year]. This paper is not the copy of record and 
may not exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. Please 
do not copy or cite without author's permission. The final article is available, upon 
publication, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000123  
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
Abstract: 
Three experiments contrasted recollection of change with differentiation as means of avoiding 
retroactive interference and proactive interference. We manipulated the extent to which 
participants looked back to notice change between pairs of cues and targets (A-B, A-D) and 
measured the effects on later cued recall of either the first or second response. Two lists of word 
pairs were presented. Some right-hand members of pairs were changed within List 2, whereas 
others were changed between lists. Participants in a Within-List Back condition were instructed 
to detect changes that occurred only during List 2, in an effort to reduce noticing changes in pairs 
between lists while simultaneously differentiating the 2 lists. In contrast, participants in an N-
Back condition were instructed to detect both within-list and between-list changes. Recall of first 
list responses that changed between lists produced retroactive facilitation for the N-Back 
condition but not for the Within-List Back condition. Similarly, recall of second list responses 
that changed between lists produced proactive facilitation for the N-Back condition but not for 
the Within-List Back condition. The greater extent of looking back increased detection of change 
and later recollection of change, which produced facilitation. When change was not recollected, 
detected change produced proactive interference. The recursive reminding produced when 
change is noticed contrasts with the simple associations of classic interference theory, and 
memory performance when change is recollected contrasts with the predictions of interference 
theory. 
Keywords: change | interference | memory | recollection | reminding 
Article: 
A fundamental phenomenon of human memory is that experience of an event that is similar to an 
earlier event but substantially changed is a source of interference that impairs memory. As a 
commonplace example, suppose that an acquaintance changed her last name when she married. 
Memory for her changed name might interfere with your later ability to recall her original name, 
an example of retroactive interference. Memory for her original name might also interfere with 
your ability to recall her changed name, an example of proactive interference. Experimental 
analogs that test memory for word pairs have changed the response with which a cue is paired 
(A-B, A-D) and tested memory for the original pair (A-B) to show retroactive interference 
compared with a control condition for which only the target pair had been studied, or tested 
memory for the changed pair (A-D) to show proactive interference. The effects extend readily to 
more naturalistic materials such as educational texts (Bower, 1974) and geometry proofs (Lovett 
& Anderson, 1994). Anderson and Neely (1996) review results from investigations of 
interference effects along with theories about the basis of such effects (also see Crowder, 1976), 
and interference is regarded as a main determinant of forgetting. 
Theories about interference effects in the verbal learning tradition are associationistic in that 
learning is assumed to reflect simple associations between stimuli and responses. Melton and 
Irwin’s two-factor theory (Melton & Irwin, 1940; also see Postman & Underwood, 1973) treated 
retroactive interference in the A-B, A-D paradigm as due to unlearning of original associations 
during the learning of changed associations and as also due to competition between changed and 
original responses at the time of test. In contrast, proactive interference was said to solely reflect 
response competition. Response competition readily accounts for intrusion errors such as 
retrieval of the response from the changed pair (A-D) being mistakenly produced during attempts 
to recall the original pair (A-B) in the case of retroactive interference or vice versa in the case of 
proactive interference. Response competition has been shown to be reduced if the contexts in 
which the original and changed pairs were differentiated (for a review of early research showing 
this, see Abra, 1972). Mensink and Raaijmakers (1988) model such effects by postulating that 
contextual cues are used in the search process in cued recall. In their model, the fluctuation of 
context cues over time is said to lead to a mismatch between context that is most current at the 
time of test and the learning context, and, consequently, lead to forgetting. The implication is 
that increasing the difference between the context in which the original and the changed 
responses are studied should increase retroactive interference because the context cues at test are 
a better match to the context in which the changed responses were studied. In contrast, increasing 
the difference between the original and changed response contexts would reduce proactive 
interference, because the context cues at test are a worse match to the context in which the 
original responses were studied. 
In accord with the context-change hypothesis, Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) presented two lists of 
unrelated nouns for study and manipulated mental context between them. Intervening between 
presentations of the two lists, half of the participants were required to imagine that they were 
invisible and write down what they would like to do knowing that they could not be held 
responsible for their actions. This was meant to shift their mental context from that of studying 
words to something very different. The other half of participants simply waited for an equivalent 
amount of time prior to presentation of the second list. Subsequent recall of words from the first 
list was much poorer following a change in mental context. That is, list differentiation created by 
change in mental context reduced proactive interference by causing forgetting of words in the 
first list. Sahakyan and Kelley used results produced by change in mental context to support their 
context-change account of directed forgetting, as they found evidence that participants in 
directed forgetting studies spontaneously try to “clear their heads” of the first list by thinking of 
something outside the context of the experiment. As will be described, we employed Sahakyan 
and Kelley’s manipulation of mental context as a means of discouraging spontaneous noticing of 
between-list changes in responses. 
Prior experiments have used a variety of manipulations, including those aimed at increasing list 
differentiation, in attempts to eliminate retroactive interference and proactive interference. 
Ultimate success in doing so would be to find that change produced no decrement in 
performance as compared with appropriate control conditions, fully eliminating proactive 
interference. In contrast, the goal of our current experiments is to show that noticing change can 
produce both retroactive facilitation (Experiment 1) and proactive facilitation (Experiments 2 
and 3) as compared with the same control conditions used to measure interference effects. Our 
goal is to transform interference effects into facilitation effects. We defer additional 
consideration of proactive effects of memory to the introduction of Experiment 2. In what 
follows, we further consider retroactive effects of memory, and outline the procedure and 
prediction of results for Experiment 1. 
Retroactive facilitation has sometimes been found in interference paradigms. Barnes and 
Underwood (1959) paired nonsense syllables with adjectives that were strongly associated (e.g., 
afraid–scared) to produce an A-B, A-B’ paradigm. Learning the changed pairing was facilitated 
as was later recall of the original pairing, and the results were interpreted as due to learning the 
changed response by using the original association as a mediator (e.g., A-B-B’). As a 
consequence as its use as a mediator, the original response was said to be maintained during the 
learning of the changed response. However, retroactive facilitation is not restricted to situations 
in which there are strong associations between responses. Robbins and Bray (1974a, b) used a 
continuous paired-associate task with pairs repeated or changed (A-B, A-D) between 
presentations. Pairs were comprised of unrelated nouns that were presented at a 5-sec rate for 
study intermixed with tests. The lag between the presentations of repeated pairs or between 
original and changed pairs varied from short (one intervening pair for 5 s) to long (five 
intervening pairs for 25 s). The retention interval between presentation of a pair and its test was 
also either short or relatively long (e.g., 5 or 25 s), with an even longer retention interval 
produced by testing memory for all pairs at the end of the experiment. Results sometimes 
revealed retroactive facilitation. Specifically, after a short lag between presentations and a 
relatively long or very long retention interval, presentation of A-D produced recall of B that was 
higher than that produced by the control condition of only having encountered A-B. Recall in the 
changed condition was sometimes as great as that produced by repetition of A-B. 
Similarly, Bruce and Weaver (1973) found retroactive facilitation in a short-term retention task 
using a paired-associate probe technique. 
Retroactive facilitation produced by changing responses is a striking contrast to typical findings 
of retroactive interference. Robbins and Bray (1974b) noted that in their experiments and those 
of Bruce and Weaver (1973) participants were informed prior to study that some pairs would 
change during the list, whereas no such instructions are given in traditional investigations of 
retroactive interference. Indeed, participants’ awareness of changes in responses is likely 
important. A possible interpretation of retroactive facilitation is that it simply reflects an implicit 
repetition effect produced when change is noticed. As in our earlier example of a friend’s name 
change, to notice the change when being reintroduced requires that one be reminded of her 
original name. The reminding entails a repetition of the original name. Similarly, retroactive 
facilitation produced by a change in response could be due to noticing the change and thereby 
implicitly repeating the original response. In the experiments by Barnes and Underwood (1959), 
the strong association between responses in the original and changed pairs makes it likely that A-
B’ pairs reminded participants of the A-B pairs. Rather than requiring mediation of A-B’ 
learning by the prior A-B association, noticing change might be sufficient to account for 
retroactive facilitation. Support for this noticing change interpretation is provided by the findings 
of retroactive facilitation even when original and changed responses are unrelated (Bruce & 
Weaver, 1973; Robbins & Bray, 1974a,1974b). Noticing change would be increased by 
forewarning participants about the A-B, A-D condition and would be further increased by a short 
lag between the presentation of original and changed pairs. 
In the current experiments, we use a “looking-back” procedure to manipulate the probability of 
noticing change. Looking-back procedures manipulate attention to the more recent versus more 
distant past to affect what is noticed and have been used to show the importance of noticing 
similarity among events for subsequent cued recall (Jacoby, 1974) and for memory of the 
temporal order of similar events (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013). As described later, a looking-back 
procedure similar to the one used in the current experiments has also been used to show the 
importance of noticing repetitions in creating an advantage of spaced over massed repetitions in 
later memory performance (Wahlheim, Maddox, & Jacoby, 2014). As described above, noticing 
change entails an implicit repetition of the original pair. The prior work establishing the effects 
of noticing repetitions on subsequent recall can be used to predict corresponding effects of 
noticing change in the current experiments, namely, retroactive facilitation. 
The procedure employed in Experiment 1 in an attempt to show that noticing change can 
produce retroactive facilitation is illustrated in Table 1. Participants were presented with two lists 
of pairs with the right-hand member of some pairs being changed either between lists or within 
List 2, intermixed with control pairs. Presentation of the two lists was separated by an interval 
during which participants were asked to imagine what they would do if they were invisible, to 
aid differentiation of the two lists (cf. Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002). Participants in a “Within-List 
Back” condition indicated if the right-hand member of a pair was changed within List 2. This 
condition was meant to further differentiate the two lists, discouraging participants from being 
reminded of the original pairs from List 1 during the presentation of changed pairs in List 2. In 
an “N-Back” condition, participants indicated if the right-hand member of a pair was 
changed either between lists or within List 2. Thus, noticing of within-list change was 
encouraged for both conditions but noticing of between-list change was encouraged only for the 
N-Back condition. At test, participants were presented with the left-hand member of pairs as a 
cue for recall of the response from the original pair (A-B). 
 
Table 1. Schematic of Item Types and Correct Looking Back Responses: Experiment 1 
 Phase Correct looking back 
responses 
Item type List 1 Invisibility List 2 Test N-Back Within-
List Back 
A-B, C-D A-B 5 min C-D A - ? No No 
Within-List A-B, A-
D 
—  A-B, A-D A - ? Yes Yes 
Between-List A-B, 
A-D 
A-B  A-D A - ? Yes No 
Note. At test, participants were instructed to recall the response from List 1. 
Our primary interest was in cued-recall for pairs that were changed between lists. We predicted 
that cued-recall of pairs that were changed between lists would reveal retroactive facilitation in 
the N-Back condition, producing a probability of recall that was higher than that for the control 
pairs. Retroactive facilitation for between-list changed pairs was not expected for the Within-List 
Back condition, because the instructions would discourage noticing of between-list changes in 
the Within-List Back condition. Further, in the N-Back condition we predicted that recall would 
be higher for between-list changed pairs than for within-list changed pairs. Noticing change 
requires that the original pair be brought to mind and the delay between the presentation of the 
original pair and its being brought to mind in the act of noticing change is much longer for 
between-list changes than for within-list changes. Thus, the longer between-list delay between 
the original pair and noticing the change should produce recall benefits that parallel the effects of 
delay on spaced repetitions, namely, a greater recall benefit for long than short spacing (for a 
review of spacing effects, see Delaney, Verkoeijen, & Spirgel, 2010). 
Results reported by Wahlheim et al. (2014) are directly relevant to our prediction of an 
advantage in recall of between-list over within-list changed pairs. They used a similar looking-
back procedure to examine effects of spacing. The important difference from the current studies 
is that pairs were repeated either within or between lists whereas in the present experiments, 
pairs were changed either within or between lists. Wahlheim et al. found an advantage in cued 
recall of between-list repetitions over within-list repetitions in the N-Back condition but not in 
the Within-List Back condition. That result for repetitions supports our prediction that noticing 
change will be critical for spaced changes to produce a benefit in recall. 
Experiments 2 and 3 sought evidence of proactive facilitation. The procedure employed in those 
experiments were the same as used in Experiment 1 to show retroactive facilitation except that 
tested control pairs were presented in List 2 rather than in List 1 and memory was tested for 
changed pairs (A-D) rather than for original pairs (A-B). 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight students from Washington University participated in exchange for $10/hr or partial 
course credit. Twenty-four participants were randomly assigned to each of the looking-back 
groups. Participants were tested individually. 
Design and materials 
A 3 (Item type: A-B, C-D vs. Within-List A-B, A-D vs. Between-List A-B, A-D) × 2 (Looking 
back: N-Back vs. Within-List Back) mixed design was used. Item type was manipulated within 
subjects and looking back instructions were manipulated between subjects. 
The materials consisted of 88 three-word sets (80 critical items, eight buffer items), each 
including a cue word (e.g., knee) and two responses that were orthographically similar to each 
other (e.g., bone, bend) taken from Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013). The forward and backward 
associative strengths between cues and responses did not differ and were low on average (M = 
.06, SD = .13, Range = 0–.92; Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). The forward and backward 
associative strengths between responses that shared a cue were extremely weak and did not differ 
(M = .01, SD = .05, Range = 0–.36). 
As illustrated in Table 1, A-B, C-D pairs were presented in Lists 1 and 2 and did not overlap 
between lists. For A-B, A-D pairs, cues were the same, but responses changed either within List 
2 or between Lists 1 and 2. Each of the three pair types were represented by 20 critical items and 
2 buffers. Across formats, pairs were rotated through conditions such that pairs appeared equally 
often as each item type across participants. 
List 1 consisted of 44 words pairs (40 critical, 4 fillers/buffers) divided evenly between A-B 
pairs from A-B, C-D items and A-B pairs from between-list A-B, A-D items. List 2 consisted of 
88 word pairs (80 critical, 8 buffers) that were distributed equally across the 4 pair types: A-B 
pairs in List 1 from A-B, C-D items; C-D pairs in List 2 from A-B, C-D items; A-D pairs 
representing within-list changed pairs; and A-D pairs representing between-list changed pairs. 
The average number of intervening items between presentations of Within-List A-B, A-D items 
(M = 5.6, SD = 1.35, Range = 3–7) was lower than for Between-List A-B, A-D items (M = 
66.82, SD = 1.95, Range = 5–121). 
A practice test included six buffers (two from each of the three conditions: C-D items; Within-
List A-B, A-D items and Between-List A-B, A-D items). The practice test immediately preceded 
the main test and the procedure was identical to that of the main test. It was a practice test only in 
that performance on the buffer items comprising that test was not included in the analyses. The 
actual test consisted of 20 critical items from each of the conditions. 
Procedure 
In List 1, word pairs appeared in random order for 5 s each followed by a 500 ms interstimulus 
interval (ISI). Participants were told to read the words aloud and to study them for an upcoming 
memory test. In the interpolated task, participants were told to imagine what they would do if 
they were invisible and to write those things down for 5 minutes. In List 2, word pairs appeared 
for 5 s each followed by a 500 ms ISI in a random order, with the restriction that no pairs from 
the same condition appeared consecutively more than three times. Primacy and recency buffers, 
distributed evenly across item types, appeared at the beginning and end of the list. 
During the presentation of List 2, participants in the N-Back group were told to detect pairs that 
changed from any point earlier in the experiment (Between- and Within-List A-B, A-D items), 
whereas those in the Within-List Back group were told to detect pairs that had changed only 
from earlier in List 2. Boxes labeled “Yes” and “No” appeared beneath the word pairs with a 
question about whether the pairs had changed that was specific to the set of looking back 
instructions. The boxes remained on the screen until one was clicked using the mouse cursor. 
After a box was clicked, pairs appeared on the screen for the remainder of the 5 s. When no 
response was made, pairs disappeared after 5 s. Participants failed to respond to fewer than 3% 
of the pairs, and this did not differ between looking back groups, t(46) = .83, p = .41. Feedback 
was given when incorrect responses about change were made to ensure that participants were 
following instructions. The message “incorrect” appeared in red ink when errors were made. 
Finally, on the practice and actual test, the left member of word pairs appeared and participants 
were told to recall the original response with which it was paired, guessing if necessary. Further, 
they were told to produce a response for every test item. Test cues appeared until participants 
typed their responses onto the screen. 
The significance level for all tests was set at p < .05. 
Results 
As shown in the top portion of Table 2, participants in the N-Back condition were more likely to 
incorrectly indicate change than were those in the Within-List Back group for control pairs (C-D 
pairs), t(46) = 4.35, p < .001. That difference likely reflects a bias effect that originates from the 
task in the N-Back group more often requiring participants to produce a “changed” response as 
compared with those in the Within-List Back group as well as poorer discrimination of change in 
the N-Back condition due to the greater number of intervening pairs across which change was to 
be detected. Change responding did not significantly differ across conditions for within-list 
changes. Most important, participants in the N-Back condition were much more likely to respond 
“changed” during the presentation of List 2 to between-list changed pairs than were participants 
in the Within-List Back condition, t(46) = 12.64, p < .001. The difference in “changed” 
responses for the two conditions provides evidence that the looking-back instructions brought 
noticing of between-list changes under task control.  
 
Table 2. Probabilities of “Yes” Responses Indicating Change Detection in List 2 as a Function of 
Item Type and Looking Back Instructions: Experiments 1–3 
 Item type 
 Looking back A-B, C-D A-B, A-D 
(Within) 
A-B, A-D 
(Between) 
Experiment 1 N-Back .23 (.04) .74 (.05) .63 (.04) 
 Within-List 
Back 
.04 (.01) .80 (.04) .11 (.02) 
Experiment 2 N-Back .24 (.04) .65 (.05) .60 (.03) 
 Within-List 
Back 
.06 (.02) .76 (.06) .17 (.03) 
Experiment 3 N-Back .29 (.06) .84 (.03) .76 (.03) 
 Within-List 
Back 
.03 (.01) .83 (.03) .12 (.02) 
Note. Standard errors of the means are presented in parentheses. 
The probability of correct recall (A-B) and of intrusion errors (A-D) is shown in Table 3 for each 
combination of conditions. The probability of correct recall for within-list changed pairs did not 
significantly differ from that for control pairs in either the N-Back or the Within-List Back 
condition. Most important, as compared with control pairs, correct recall of between-list changed 
pairs revealed retroactive facilitation in the N-Back condition, t(23) = 3.96, p = .001, but did not 
do so in the Within-List Back condition, t(23) = .30, p = .77. For the N-Back condition, correct 
recall was higher for between-list changed pairs than for within-list changed pairs, t(23) = 
3.54, p = .002, which corresponds to an effect of spacing of repetitions. For pairs changed 
between lists, there was a nonsignificant trend showing that cued-recall was higher in the N-
Back condition than in the Within-List Back condition t(46) = 1.33, p = .19, indicating the 
importance of noticing change.  
 
Table 3. Probabilities of Correct Recall and Intrusions as a Function of Item Type and Looking 
Back Instructions: Experiment 1 
 Item type 
Response Looking back A-B, C-D A-B, A-D 
(Within) 
A-B, A-D 
(Between) 
Correct N-Back .40 (.03) .37 (.04) .50 (.03) 
 Within-List 
Back 
.45 (.03) .39 (.04) .44 (.03) 
P2 Intrusion N-Back .03 (.01) .18 (.02) .16 (.02) 
 Within-List 
Back 
.04 (.01) .17 (.02) .18 (.02) 
Note. Standard errors of the means are displayed in parentheses. 
The probability of producing the response from the changed pair (A-D) as an intrusion error was 
significantly higher for both between-list and within-list changed pairs than for control pairs as 
evidenced by a main effect of item type, F(2, 92) = 41.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. The probability of 
an A-D intrusion error did not differ significantly among looking-back conditions or type of 
change. Aside from correct response and intrusion errors from the changed pair, responses were 
extraexperimental intrusions that occurred with high probability, likely due to the requirement to 
produce a response to every test item. 
The finding that A-D intrusion errors were higher for changed pairs than for control pairs 
suggests that responding reflected a mix of retroactive interference produced by response 
competition and retroactive facilitation produced by noticing change. Conditionalizing correct 
recall on whether change was noticed or not provides evidence that this was the case. For the N-
Back condition, the probability of correct recall of original responses was higher when change 
was detected than when change was not detected for within-list changed pairs (.38 vs. .19) and 
for between-list changed pairs (.60 vs. .30), F(1, 20) = 30.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .60. The effect of 
change detection did not interact with item type, F(1, 20) = 1.28, p = .27, ηp2 = .06, but the larger 
recall advantage for original responses when between-list changes were detected accords with 
the overall recall advantage for between-list changed pairs over within-list changed pairs, and 
can be seen as akin to an effect of spacing repetitions. For the N-Back condition, it is notable that 
as compared with the probability of recall for control items, recall of original responses from 
between-list changed pairs for which change was detected shows retroactive facilitation (.60 vs. 
.38), t(20) = 5.94, p < .001, whereas recall of original responses from between-list changed pairs 
for which change was not detected shows a marginal trend toward retroactive interference (.30 
vs. .38), t(20) = −1.99, p = .06. 
Overall, the results provide support for the claim that noticing change requires that the original 
pair be brought to mind by presentation of a changed pair, and that doing so produces retroactive 
facilitation. Just as a longer lag between spaced repetitions increases the probability of recall, a 
longer lag between spacing of original and changed pairs increases the probability of recalling 
the response from an original pair. In contrast to arguments made by Barnes and Underwood 
(1959), the finding of retroactive facilitation does not require a strong association between the 
original and changed responses that is used to mediate the learning of the changed response. 
Rather, retroactive facilitation in the current experiment was found although there was little or no 
preexperimental association between the original and changed response (also see, Bruce & 
Weaver, 1973; Robbins & Bray, 1974a, 1974b). Rather, the repetition of the original response 
that is involved in noticing change by itself is sufficient to produce retroactive facilitation. 
Noticing change could be useful in more applied contexts as well, and one candidate is the 
misinformation effect in eyewitness testimony. After viewing a staged crime, participants are 
exposed to changed details in the context of a narrative meant to recap the crime (Greene, Flynn, 
& Loftus, 1982), and then are tested for their memory of the original event. Misinformation 
produces worse memory for the original details, as in a retroactive interference paradigm. 
However, if participants notice the changed details in the misinformation narrative, they do not 
show impaired memory for the original event. Warning participants prior to presenting the 
misinformation narrative that some details may be incorrect reduces susceptibility to the 
misinformation (Greene et al., 1982), as does attributing the misinformation narrative to an 
untrustworthy source (the driver involved in a car accident, Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980.) Those 
effects likely stem from noticing the changes between the original event and changed narrative 
(Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). 
Requiring participants to detect change can be seen as akin to a testing effect. Many experiments 
have shown that testing participants on previously learned information produces memory 
benefits beyond rereading (for a review, see Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). Viewing instructed 
detection of change as a test raises the possibility that detection of change might produce an even 
higher probability of later recall than does rereading a repetition. That is, retrieving an original 
pairing to notice change might sometimes do more to enhance its later recall than does repeating 
the pairing to be read. Results reported by Mantyla and Cornoldi (2002) provide some support 
for this possibility. They presented photographs of faces with the second presentation being 
either identical or a mirror image of the first presentation. A test of recognition memory was 
given with participants being asked to report whether they recognized a face by consciously 
recollecting its prior presentation or on the basis of its familiarity. Changed faces were better 
recognized than were repeated faces and their recognition was more likely to be reported as 
relying on recollection than was that of repeated faces. Perhaps results of this sort will be 
obtained only when change is noticed. 
In our experiment, the changed pair (A-D) was presented only once as in Robbins and Bray 
(1974a,1974b). Of course, in traditional experiments that have found retroactive interference, the 
A-D pair is repeatedly presented and tested until learned to a criterion. It is an empirical question 
whether people continue to be reminded of the original pair across repeated presentation of a 
changed pair, or whether mechanisms such as unlearning (e.g., Melton & Irwin, 1940), retrieval 
inhibition (e.g., Anderson, 2003), or increased response competition eventually predominate to 
produce retroactive interference. 
Experiment 2 
As revealed by the results of Experiment 1, beneficial effects of retrieving the original response 
that are produced by reminding are sufficient to explain findings of retroactive facilitation. 
However, such facilitation of memory for the original response alone could not result in 
proactive facilitation. The original response is the target in experiments investigating retroactive 
effects but, instead, is the competitor for recall of the changed response, which is the target for 
experiments investigating proactive effects of memory. Proactive interference has been 
explained as solely due to response competition (Melton & Irwin, 1940; Postman & Underwood, 
1973). A response competition account would predict that increased recall of the original 
response produced by noticing change would increase proactive interference. In contrast, we 
predict that noticing change can transform proactive interference into proactive facilitation as 
well as produce retroactive facilitation. The means by which proactive facilitation occurs can be 
illustrated by returning to the example of recalling an acquaintance’s changed name. Upon later 
encountering the acquaintance, recollection that her name has changed, perhaps in combination 
with memory for the original name, provides additional cues for recall of the changed name 
compared with the case for recall of an equally learned, unchanged name (a control condition). 
Reliance on those additional cues can result in proactive facilitation. By this account, finding of 
proactive facilitation requires both detection of change at the time of presentation of a changed 
response and also requires that change be recollected at the time of test. As will be described, 
prior research (e.g., Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013) has shown the importance of recollection of 
change for finding proactive facilitation. 
Much research has been done to explore whether eliminating response competition can reduce 
proactive interference. However, none of the suggested techniques for doing so would predict 
finding proactive facilitation. Underwood (1945) suggested that list differentiation could reduce 
intrusion errors by allowing participants to identify the origin of potential responses and 
withhold those that originated from the wrong list. Later, Winograd (1968) measured list 
discrimination by asking people to identify the list from which their responses originated. Marcia 
Johnson and her colleagues have used similar measures of source memory, and have shown that 
source memory can be used to edit-out potential responses that originate from an undesired 
source (e.g., Johnson & Raye, 1981). By a source monitoring account, differentiation of sources 
can serve to reduce intrusion errors but would not increase correct responding over that of 
control items, as in Gruppuso, Lindsay, and Kelley (1997). Editing responses to avoid intrusions 
cannot be used to account for a finding of proactive facilitation. 
Against the possibility that differentiation is the sole means of avoiding proactive interference, 
noticing change has been shown to turn proactive interference into proactive facilitation just as 
suggested by the example of remembering a changed name. Putnam, Wahlheim, and Jacoby 
(2014) provide a set of experiments that demonstrates the benefits of noticing and later 
recollecting change. In their experiments, fictitious politicians were paired with positions held in 
a first debate, and then with the same or changed positions in a second debate. The change in 
positions held by a politician across debates corresponds to an A-B, A-D condition for word 
pairs. During the second debate, participants were to press a key when they noticed that a 
candidate had changed his position on an issue. At test, the names of issues addressed during the 
second debate were provided as cues for recall of the position held by each candidate during that 
debate. Following recall, participants indicated whether the candidate changed his position on the 
issue across the two debates (a measure of recollection of change). 
The probability of correct cued recall did not differ for positions that changed between debates as 
compared with a control condition for which the politician only expressed a position on an issue 
in the second debate (the control condition for measuring proactive interference). However, cued 
recall depended on the detection and recollection of change. When participants responded that 
they recollected that a politician’s position changed across debates, proactive facilitation of 
memory for the changed position was found whereas absence of recollection of change at test 
resulted in proactive interference. That is, the lack of difference between the change and control 
conditions found in the unconditionalized data reflected a mix of proactive facilitation when 
change was recollected and proactive interference when change was not recollected. Further, 
noticing change alone was not sufficient for proactive facilitation to be found but, rather, it was 
necessary that change also be recollected at the time of test. Indeed, detection of change followed 
by a failure to recollect change produced poorer cued-recall performance than was found when 
change was not detected. Experiments that examined memory for word pairs have produced 
results showing similar benefits of change recollection (Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Yonelinas, 
2013; Wahlheim, 2014; Wahlheim, 2015; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). 
To interpret the importance of noticing and recollecting change, these earlier studies (also 
see Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013) extended the notion of “remindings” advanced by Hintzman 
(2011) and by Benjamin (e.g., Benjamin & Ross, 2010; Benjamin & Tullis, 2010). As outlined 
for the case of retroactive facilitation, noticing change requires that the presentation of A-D 
remind one of the prior presentation of A-B, and the reminding experience produces a recursive 
trace that embeds memory for the original event (A-B) into that of the changed event (A-D). 
Recollection of having noticed change provides access to the original and changed responses 
along with their order, producing proactive facilitation. The order of responses is preserved 
because recollection of having been reminded of A-B by the presentation of A-D allows one to 
be certain that A-D occurred more recently than did A-B. When change is not noticed or noticed 
but not recollected, proactive interference is produced due to competition between the original 
and changed responses. The retrieval of the original event (A-B) that is required to notice change 
acts as a repetition of the original response and, thereby, produces greater proactive interference 
when change is noticed but not recollected as compared with the case when change goes 
unnoticed. 
From our prior results (e.g., Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013) we inferred that proactive facilitation 
occurred when change was noticed and recollected, but we did not find an overall recall 
advantage for changed pairs as compared with control pairs. The overall recall of changed pairs 
was sometimes below that of control pairs, showing proactive interference, and was sometimes 
equal to that of control pairs. The conclusion that recollection of change produces proactive 
facilitation has rested on conditionalized results showing that when change is recollected 
proactive facilitation as compared with control pairs is found whereas when change is not 
recollected proactive interference is found. In recognition that conditionalized results carries the 
danger of item differences being responsible for observed effects, we have used hierarchical 
regression analyses to show that recollection of change contributes to recall of responses from 
changed pairs (A-D) beyond item differences measured by performance on control items. 
However, the hierarchical regression analyses do not allow the rejection of alternative accounts 
of our results. In particular, they leave open the possibility that the apparent advantage of change 
recollection actually reflects use of source information to edit potential responses (cf. Johnson & 
Raye, 1981; Winograd, 1968). What we have interpreted as evidence of an effect of recollection 
of change could actually reflect cases in which both the original and changed response are 
implicitly recalled with source editing used to choose between responses. Implicitly recalling 
both responses would result in participants judging that responses were changed. Recalling both 
responses would also make it obvious to participants that the source of the different responses 
should be assessed to choose the correct response. Recalling both responses would also provide 
an advantage for choosing between the two responses on the basis of source information. This is 
because identifying the source of either one of the two responses allows identification of the 
other by means of a process of elimination. Such source editing would create the possibility of an 
item-selection effect operating at the level of memory for the two pairs (A-B and A-D) rather 
than at the level of memory for an individual pair and, so, not be taken into account by prior 
hierarchical analyses. In sum, the argument is that judgments of “changed” occur when both 
responses come to mind but are less likely to occur when only a single response comes to mind. 
As well as resulting in a “changed” response, both responses coming to mind triggers source 
editing that leads to the correct response being given. Consequently, conditionalizing on the 
measure of recollection of change reflects pairs for which both responses come to mind holding a 
recall advantage over pairs for which only a single response comes to mind rather than an effect 
of recollection of change per se. 
An argument of the above sort provides an alternative explanation for findings that we have 
interpreted as evidence of proactive facilitation when using conditionalized data as well as for 
results from the hierarchical regression analyses that we have done to take item differences into 
account. However, it would not be possible to use a source-editing explanation to account for a 
finding of proactive facilitation if conditions produce overall higher recall of changed responses 
as compared with control pairs. Again, perfect source editing would only eliminate proactive 
interference, but not produce proactive facilitation in unconditionalized results. Experiment 2 
employed procedures that are the same as those employed in Experiment 1 to show retroactive 
facilitation but rather than asking participants to recall the original response (A-B), they were 
asked to recall the most recent response (A-D). Also, control pairs were in List 2 rather than in 
List 1. 
We predicted that results for Experiment 2 would be very similar to those found for Experiment 
1. That is, we predicted proactive facilitation in the N-Back condition for between-list, changed 
pairs but not for within-list changed pairs. We also predicted an effect of spacing such that recall 
of changed pairs in the N-Back condition would be higher for between-list, as compared with 
within-list, changed pairs. We did not expect to find corresponding differences in the Within-List 
Back condition. These predictions are based on the expectation that noticing change is important 
for later recollection of change, with recollection of change being more likely when noticing 
change occurs after a long delay between the original and the changed pair. The procedure of 
Experiment 2 parallels that of Experiment 1 in that recollection of change was not tested, 
although it will be measured in Experiment 3. 
Our goal in Experiment 2 is to demonstrate proactive facilitation in overall recall to allow us to 
draw the conclusion that proactive facilitation results from detection and recollection of change. 
A second reason it is important to demonstrate proactive facilitation in overall recall relates to 
individual differences found in our prior investigations. In particular, hierarchical regression 
analyses done at the subject level in our prior experiments revealed that individual differences in 
the probability of recollecting change contributed greatly to the probability of recalling changed 
responses. For example, Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013, Experiment 3) found that individual 
differences in recollection of change accounted for 51% of the variance in cued recall of 
responses from changed pairs (A-D) after general memory ability, measured by performance on 
control pairs (C-D), had already been entered as a predictor. Jacoby (1974) provided evidence of 
individual differences in the extent to which participants looked back to notice similarity among 
presented items that contributed to their subsequent cued-recall performance. Similarly, 
individual differences in the extent to which participants look back to notice change might 
contribute to their subsequent cued recall of changed responses. A finding of greater cued-recall 
for between-list, changed responses in the N-Back condition than in the Within-Back condition 
would be consistent with this possibility, showing that looking back over a greater extent does 
improve subsequent cued recall performance in the form of proactive facilitation. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight students from Washington University participated in exchange for $10/hr or partial 
course credit. Twenty-four participants were randomly assigned to each of the looking-back 
groups. Participants were tested individually. 
Design, materials, and procedure 
The design, materials, and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that 
recall of the changed response was tested rather than that of the original response, and control 
pairs were pairs presented in List 2 rather than in List 1. 
Results 
In general, results found for proactive effects in Experiment 2 replicated those found for 
retroactive effects in Experiment 1. As shown in Table 2, participants in the N-Back condition 
were more likely to incorrectly indicate change during the presentation of List 2 than were those 
in the Within-List Back group for control pairs (C-D pairs), t(46) = 4.47, p < .001. Change 
responding did not significantly differ across conditions for within-list changes. Most important, 
participants in the N-Back condition were much more likely to respond “changed” during the 
presentation of List 2 to between-list changed pairs than were participants in the Within-List 
Back condition, t(46) = 10.28, p < .001. The difference in “changed” responses for the two 
conditions again provides evidence that the looking-back instructions brought the noticing of 
between-list changes under task control. 
The probability of correct recall for within-list changed pairs did not significantly differ from 
that for control pairs in either the N-Back or the Within-List Back condition (top portion of Table 
4). Most important, the probability of correct recall for control pairs versus between-list changed 
pairs significantly interacted with looking-back condition, F(1, 46) = 7.38, p < .01, ηp2 = .14. As 
compared with control pairs, correct recall of between-list changed pairs revealed proactive 
facilitation in the N-Back condition, t(23) = 2.71, p < .01, but did not do so in the Within-List 
Back condition, t(23) = −1.06, p = .30. Correct recall of between-list changed pairs was higher in 
the N-Back condition than in the Within-List Back condition, t(46) = 2.55, p = .01. For the N-
Back condition, correct recall for between-list changed pairs held a numerical advantage over 
that for within-list changed pairs, but the difference was not significant. As will be seen, the 
corresponding difference was significant in Experiment 3.  
 
Table 4. Probabilities of Correct Recall and Intrusions as a Function of Item Type and Looking 
Back Instructions: Experiments 2 and 3 
 Item type 
Experiment Response Looking back A-B, C-D A-B, A-D 
(Within) 
A-B, A-D 
(Between) 
Experiment 2 Correct N-Back .36 (.03) .40 (.03) .46 (.04) 
  Within-List 
Back 
.36 (.04) .36 (.04) .33 (.03) 
 P1 Intrusion N-Back .03 (.01) .25 (.02) .23 (.03) 
  Within-List 
Back 
.03 (01) .20 (.03) .32 (.02) 
Experiment 3 Correct N-Back .40 (03) .40 (.03) .48 (.03) 
  Within-List 
Back 
.40 (04) .43 (.04) .40 (.03) 
 P1 Intrusion N-Back .02 (.01) .19 (.02) .20 (.02) 
  Within-List 
Back 
.02 (.01) .18 (.02) .39 (.02) 
Note. Standard errors of the means are displayed in parentheses. 
For intrusion errors, the main effect of item type was significant, F(2, 92) = 99.60, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .69, qualified by an interaction between item type and looking-back condition, F(2, 92) = 
6.45, p < .002, ηp2 = .12. For both looking-back conditions, intrusion errors occurred more 
frequently for within-list and between-list changed pairs than for control pairs. For between-list 
changed pairs, the probability of an intrusion error was lower in the N-Back condition than in the 
Within-List Back condition, t(46) = 2.17, p = .04. 
The pattern of results for correct responses in combination with the pattern of intrusion errors 
provides evidence that overall responding reflected a combination of proactive facilitation 
produced by recollection of change and proactive interference resulting from response 
competition when recollection of change failed. Such results are as expected if the N-Back 
condition held an advantage in recollection of change over the Within-List Back condition that 
both increased the probability of correct recall and decreased the probability of intrusion errors. 
Comparing across the results of Experiments 1 and 2 (Tables 3 and 4), the N-Back condition 
produced overall retroactive facilitation (Experiment 1) and overall proactive facilitation 
(Experiment 2) for between-list changed pairs relative to control pairs. However, there are 
differences in results between the two experiments. For between-list changed pairs, the 
probability of an intrusion error is larger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, particularly for 
the Within-List Back condition. That difference is understandable in terms of the repetition effect 
for responses from the original pair (A-B) produced by noticing change. For retroactive effects 
of memory (Experiment 1), that repetition effect favors the target response from the original pair 
(A-B), whereas, for proactive effects of memory, the repetition effect favors the competitor for 
the target response. In the N-Back condition, competition from the competitor is better countered 
by recollection of change as compared with the Within-List Back condition. Further evidence for 
this interpretation is provided by examining the probability of correct responding given the 
presence versus absence of detection of change. In Experiment 1, the probability of correct recall 
given detection of change for between-list changed pairs in the N-Back condition was much 
higher than was the probability of correct recall given the absence of detection of change (.62 vs. 
.29), t(23) = 6.02, p < .001. In contrast, in Experiment 2, the probability of correct recall given 
detection of change in the N-Back condition differed little from the probability of correct recall 
given the absence of detection of change for between-list changes (.45 vs. .47). The difference 
does not approach significance, t(23) = −.34, p = .74, and the direction of the differences is 
opposite to that observed in Experiment 1 for retroactive effects of memory. Again, the 
difference in results can be explained as arising because the repetition effect involved in noticing 
change favors the competitor for proactive effects of memory, whereas it favors the target 
response for retroactive effects of memory. Overall, proactive facilitation requires that the effect 
of recollection of change successfully counters the repetition effect produced for competitors by 
prior noticing of change. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 2, the proactive facilitation observed for between-list changed pairs in the N-Back 
condition but not in the Within-List Back condition was predicted because of expected 
differences in recollection of change, but recollection of change was not directly measured. The 
procedure in Experiment 3 was generally the same as in Experiment 2, but following cued-recall 
for each pair, change recollection was measured by asking participants to indicate whether the 
pair was changed in the context of the experiment as a whole. If they indicated that the pair 
changed, they were asked to recall the response paired with the cue in the original pair. We 
predicted that the probability of recollection of change for between-list changed pairs would be 
greater in the N-Back condition than in the Within-List Back condition, and would produce 
overall proactive facilitation for between-list changed pairs. Given that cued recall depends on 
recollection of change, the difference in recollection of change would account for the difference 
between the N-Back and Within-List Back conditions in their cued-recall of responses from 
between-list changed pairs. Further, we predicted that recall of the original response in the N-
Back condition would be high following a judgment that a pair was changed, and higher for 
between-list changes than for within-list changes. That result would show convergence between 
the retroactive facilitation found in Experiment 1 and a role of memory for responses in original 
pairs (A-B) in proactive facilitation. Other differences in the procedure were meant to generalize 
the results. Rather than instructing participants to learn pairs presented in List 1 as done in 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to judge the association between members of pairs. 
The change in tasks between Lists 1 and 2 was meant to further differentiate the lists, but results 
were expected to replicate those of Experiment 2. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-two students from Washington University participated in exchange for $10/hr or partial 
course credit. Thirty-six participants were randomly assigned to each of the looking-back groups. 
Participants were tested individually. 
Design, materials, and procedure 
The design, materials, and procedure were identical to Experiment 2 with the following 
exceptions: During List 1, participants were told to rate the associations between cues and 
responses. Pairs appeared for 3 s, and then a scale ranging from (1 = unrelated to 7 = related) 
appeared below the pairs until participants entered a response. During List 2, no feedback was 
given following change detection responses. At test, a measure of change recollection was 
included. After participants attempted to recall the most recent response paired with a cue, they 
were asked to indicate whether the right-hand word paired with the cue had changed at any point 
earlier in the experiment. Boxes labeled “Yes” and “No” appeared below a question asking 
whether change had occurred until participants clicked one with the mouse cursor. When 
participants responded “Yes” they were then asked to recall the earlier response that had been 
paired with the cue and to type it onto the screen. 
Results 
Effects of condition on noticing change in Experiment 3 replicated those found in Experiments 1 
and 2 (bottom portion of Table 2). Participants in the N-Back condition were much more likely 
to respond “changed” to between-list changes than were participants in the Within-List Back 
condition, t(70) = 20.03, p < .001. During the presentation of List 2, participants in the N-Back 
condition were more likely to incorrectly respond “changed” to control pairs than were those in 
the Within-List Back condition, t(70) = 4.51, p < .001. Detection of within-list changed pairs did 
not differ between the looking-back conditions, t(70) = .36, p = .72. 
The cued-recall results also replicated results found in Experiment 2 (bottom portion of Table 4). 
The probability of correct responding to within-list changed pairs did not significantly differ 
from that to control pairs in either the N-Back or the Within-List Back condition. As compared 
with control pairs, correct recall of between-list, changed pairs revealed proactive facilitation in 
the N-Back condition, t(35) = 2.23, p = .03, but not in the Within-List Back condition, t(35) = 
.05, p = .96. Cued-recall of between-list changed responses was higher in the N-Back condition 
than in the Within-List Back condition, t(70) = 2.03, p < .05. For the N-Back condition, correct 
recall for between-list changed pairs was greater than that for within-list changed pairs, t(35) = 
2.77, p = .009. The corresponding difference in Experiment 2 only approached significance. 
Replicating the results of Experiment 2, analyses of intrusion errors (bottom of Table 4) revealed 
a highly significant effect of item type, F(2, 140) = 156.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .69, showing that 
intrusion errors were much lower for control pairs than for either within-list or between-list 
changed pairs, qualified by an interaction of item type and looking-back condition, F(2, 140) = 
26.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. The probability of an intrusion error for within-list changed pairs did 
not differ for the looking-back conditions. However, for between-list pairs, the probability of an 
intrusion error was much lower for the N-Back as compared with the Within-List Back 
condition, t(70) = 5.79, p < .001. Results for correct recall in combination with those for 
intrusions errors show that overall recall performance reflected a mix of proactive interference 
produced by response competition and proactive facilitation produced by recollection of change 
with the balance being one of overall proactive facilitation. 
As shown in Table 5, the manipulation of looking-back instructions produced differences in 
recollection of change. As predicted, the probability of recollection of change for within-list 
versus between-list changes interacted with looking-back conditions, F(1, 70) = 23.41, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .25. N-Back and Within-List Back conditions did not differ in the probability of 
erroneously recollecting change for control pairs, nor did they differ in correct recollection of 
change for within-list changes, largest t(70) = .95, p = .35. However, recollection of change for 
between-list changes was much higher in the N-Back than in the Within-List Back 
condition, t(70) = 4.70, p < .001, consistent with the suggestion that differences in correct cued-
recall as well as differences in intrusion errors for changed pairs resulted from differences in 
recollection of change. Also, in the N-Back condition, recollection of change was higher for 
between-list changes than for within-list changes, t(35) = 5.58, p < .001. That difference is in 
accord with the corresponding advantage in cued recall for pairs that were changed between lists 
over those that were changed within List 2.  
 
Table 5. Probabilities of Change Recollection as a Function of Item Type and Looking Back 
Instructions: Experiment 3 
 Item type 
Looking back A-B, C-D A-B, A-D 
(Within) 
A-B, A-D 
(Between) 
N-Back .10 (.01) .56 (.03) .70 (.03) 
Within-List Back .08 (.01) .59 (.04) .48 (.04) 
Note. Standard errors of the means are displayed in parentheses. 
The advantage in recollection of between-list changes in the N-Back condition occurred even 
though the probability of noticing change was higher for within-list changes than for between-list 
changes, F(1, 35) = 44.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. For the N-Back condition, between-list changes 
that were detected were almost always later recollected (.76 vs. .70), t(35) = 2.58, p = .01. By 
comparison, within-list changes that were detected were more prone to forgetting (.84 vs. 
.56), t(35) = 7.80, p < .001. Change detected after a long delay was more memorable than change 
detected after a short delay. 
Surprisingly, for the Within-List Back condition, the probability of recollecting between-list 
changes was much higher than the probability of mistakenly accepting a between-list change as 
being a within-list change during the presentation of List 2 (.48 recollected vs. .12 mistakenly 
judged as changed), t(35) = −7.88, p < .001. That difference could arise from participants 
sometimes detecting between-list changes during the presentation of List 2 but correctly 
identifying them as between-list and, so, not false alarming to them as within-list changes. If so, 
the looking-back instructions reduced but did not fully eliminate noticing the between-list 
changes. Alternatively, when asked at test whether responses changed at any point in the 
experiment, participants in the Within-List Back condition might for the first time look back to 
memory for List 1 and detect between-list changes that were not detected during the presentation 
of List 2. Results from other experiments have provided evidence that asking a question about 
the relationship between events at the time of test can lead to noticing relationships that were 
previously unnoticed (Jacoby et al., 2013; Wahlheim et al., 2014). 
At test, if change was recollected, participants attempted to recollect the original response. The 
results displayed in Table 6 reveal a significant interaction between type of change and looking-
back condition in the probability of recollecting the original response F(1, 70) = 14.16, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .17. The probability of recalling the original response given that change was recollected 
was greater for between-list changes than for within-list changes in both the N-Back 
condition, t(35) = 10.78, p < .001, and the Within-List Back condition, t(35) = 2.19, p = .04, but 
the effect was much larger in the N-Back condition. As described for retroactive facilitation in 
Experiment 1, the advantage in recall of original responses for between-list changed pairs can be 
attributed to an effect of the increased spacing of their earlier retrieval. To notice change requires 
retrieval of the original response, and the experience of noticing produces a recursive trace that 
integrates the original response with the changed response. Consequently, recollection of change 
can cue recall of the original response with this being made more likely by the earlier spaced 
retrieval of the original response. In contrast, in the Within-List Back condition, there is more 
opportunity for a between-list change to be noticed for the first time at test, which would be more 
likely if an original response is particularly memorable.  
 
Table 6. Probabilities of Recall of Original Responses (P1) for A-B, A-D Items Following 
Change Recollection as a Function of Item Type and Looking Back Instructions: Experiment 3 
 Item type 
Looking back A-B, A-D (Within) A-B, A-D (Between) 
N-Back .44 (.04) .79 (.04) 
Within-List Back .51 (.05) .62 (.04) 
Note. Standard errors of the means are displayed in parentheses. 
Overall, the results from Experiments 2 and 3 show that recollection of change can produce 
proactive facilitation. These findings of overall proactive facilitation lend support for our 
interpretation of earlier findings using conditionalized data (e.g., Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim 
& Jacoby, 2013). In the following, we report conditionalized results to highlight points of 
convergence. We do so only for the N-back condition because that is the condition that showed 
overall proactive facilitation. Conditionalized results show that recollection of change relied on 
prior noticing of change. For the N-Back condition, recollection of change was greater when it 
was noticed in List 2 than when it was not for both within-list change (.58 vs. .33) and between-
list change (.79 vs. .38), F(1, 30) = 77.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .72. These results are in accord with 
unconditionalized results showing effects of within versus between-list changes on the 
probability of recollection of change and on correct recall of changed responses. However, note 
that the probability of recollection of change when change was not noticed during the 
presentation of List 2 is far from zero. In part, this likely reflects the influence of guessing on the 
recollection of change measure. Participants sometimes erroneously claimed that the response 
had been changed for control items, showing evidence of such guessing. Also, for changed pairs, 
there might be cases for which change was not noticed during the presentation of List 2 but was 
noticed for the first time when memory for change was tested. 
Recollection of change as well as noticing change was important for subsequent recall in the N-
Back condition (see Figure 1). When between-list change was noticed and recollected, recall of 
changed responses showed proactive facilitation as compared with control pairs, t(29) = 4.38, p < 
.001. In contrast, when between-list change was noticed but not later recollected, recall of 
changed responses showed striking proactive interference, t(29) = −7.53, p < .001. When 
between-list change was neither noticed nor recollected, recall of changed responses was lower 
than that for control pairs, but not significantly so, t = −0.82, p = .42. This pattern of results is the 
same as observed in prior experiments (Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). The 
corresponding results for intrusion errors showed that the probability of the response from the 
original pair (A-B) being given as an intrusion error following noticing and recollection of 
change was quite low and not greatly different from that for control pairs (.08 vs. .02), t(29) = 
2.66, p = .01. When change was noticed but not recollected, the probability of the original 
response being mistakenly given as an intrusion error was much higher than when change was 
not noticed and not recollected (.53 vs. .36), t(29) = 2.14, p = .04. As argued above, noticing 
change requires that memory of the original event is retrieved by presentation of the changed 
event. Doing so serves as a repetition for the response from the original pair. Recollection of 
change increases recall of the changed response and reduces intrusion errors, producing 
proactive facilitation. When change is noticed but not recollected, the repetition effect for the 
original response produces increased proactive interference. 
 
Figure 1. Probabilities of correct recall of the most recent responses (left panel) and 
probabilities of P1 intrusions (right panel) for A-B, C-D items and Between-List A-B, A-D items 
in the N-Back group in Experiment 3 conditionalized on the detection and recollection of change 
are displayed above. These probabilities were computed from the 30 subjects who had at least 
one observation in each of the above cells. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
General Discussion 
Results from the current experiments revealed both retroactive facilitation (Experiment 1) and 
proactive facilitation (Experiments 2 and 3) in overall cued recall performance. Retroactive 
facilitation can be understood as resulting from the repetition effect produced by bringing the 
original pair (A-B) to mind during the presentation of the changed pair (A-D), which is required 
for change to be noticed. To understand proactive facilitation, we argue that noticing change 
produces a recursive representation that embeds memory for the original pair into that for the 
changed pair. At test, the original response coming to mind sometimes assists in retrieval of the 
recursive representation and in combination with recollection of change, results in proactive 
facilitation. Proactive facilitation results from later recollection of change. This process was 
illustrated by the commonplace example of an acquaintance’s original name coming to mind 
along with memory for it having changed, and its doing so aiding retrieval of the changed name. 
When change is not recollected, memory for the original response competes with that for the 
changed response, producing proactive interference. Evidence for the crucial role played by 
recollection of change was revealed by findings in Experiment 3 showing that looking back to 
List 1, which was instructed for the N-Back condition but discouraged for the Within-List Back 
condition, increased both the noticing and the later recollection of change with the result being 
that proactive facilitation was observed for between-list, changed pairs in the N-Back condition 
but not in the Within-List Back condition. The pattern of intrusion errors in combination with the 
pattern of correct responses across conditions show that overall performance reflected a mix of 
proactive facilitation produced by recollection of change and proactive interference produced by 
response competition. 
The repetition of the original response involved in noticing change favored the target item for 
retroactive effects, thereby producing retroactive facilitation in Experiment 1. Retroactive 
facilitation was found for pairs changed between lists but was not found for pairs changed within 
lists. The interval between the prior presentation of an original pair and its coming to mind to 
notice change was much longer for between-list, changed pairs, and, so, produced a beneficial 
effect of spacing repetitions (cf. Wahlheim et al., 2014). For proactive facilitation to be observed 
in Experiments 2 and 3, it was necessary for recollection of change to successfully overcome the 
stronger response competition produced by the retrieval of the original pair that occurred when 
change was noticed. Noticing a between-list change entails retrieval of the original pair after a 
long delay and so produced a spaced-repetition effect that favored the competitor, making 
recollection of change particularly important to overcome proactive interference. As expected, 
between-list change increased intrusion errors relative to within-list change in the Within-List 
Back condition, but did not do so in the N-Back condition. The increased probability of 
recollection of change in the N-Back condition was sufficient to counter the increased advantage 
for competitors produced by their spaced repetition, but recollection of change in the Within-List 
Back condition was not sufficient to do so. 
By showing retroactive facilitation and the importance of recollection of change we depart from 
the associationistic view that motivated the two-factor theory of forgetting (Melton & Irwin, 
1940; Postman & Underwood, 1973). Barnes and Underwood (1959) found that the presence of a 
strong association between original and changed responses (A-B, A-B’) resulted in retroactive 
facilitation. They argued that retroactive facilitation occurred because participants learned the 
second list by creating mediators with the first responses (A-B-B’), and used that mediating 
relationship to retrieve the original response. Our results show that retroactive and proactive 
facilitation can be found with little or no association between responses (see also Wahlheim, 
2015, which used completely unrelated pairs). Two-factor theory held that proactive interference 
reflects only response competition. In contrast, our results show the necessity of also taking into 
account noticing and recollection of change to predict when proactive interference in overall 
performance will be observed. The claim that noticing change produces a recursive 
representation contrasts with the description of retroactive and proactive interference effects as 
only involving simple associations between stimuli and responses. 
The finding of retroactive and proactive facilitation in overall performance cannot be explained 
as a function of using source monitoring to edit out intrusion errors. At best, such source editing 
could produce performance that was equal to that for control pairs, but could not produce 
performance for changed pairs that was superior to that for control pairs. Differentiation of 
sources can be used to reduce retroactive and proactive interference produced by response 
competitions (for a review, see Abra, 1972). It is useful to compare the costs and benefits gained 
from differentiation of sources with those gained from noticing and recollection of change. If 
sources are sufficiently differentiated, responses from the inappropriate source will seldom come 
to mind, and if they do so, intrusion errors can be avoided by careful source monitoring. 
However, differentiation of sources is antagonistic to noticing change and later recollection of 
change. Noticing and recollection of change offers the benefit of allowing one to avoid proactive 
interference produced by response competition, and the additional benefit of allowing one to 
recall the earlier-presented, nontarget response. Ability to recall both the original and the 
changed response is sometimes useful, as in the case of educational materials, where one’s aim is 
to learn both that King A used General B to fight War C, and King A used General E to fight 
War F (Bower, 1974). 
Another benefit of noticing change and later recollection of change is that it supports memory for 
order and recency. Jacoby et al. (2013) showed that noticing and recollection of change produces 
memory for list membership that is superior to that produced when change is not noticed. Source 
memory, which is important for avoiding intrusion errors via an editing process, might itself be 
improved more when change is noticed than it would be had the situations been differentiated in 
a way that discouraged the noticing of change. However, noticing change also carries a potential 
cost if change is not recollected. The cost is due to the fact that noticing change strengthens the 
original response as it is retrieved during noticing, and so the original response is even more 
competitive with the target response if change is not recollected than if change had not been 
noticed in the first place. That pattern of results was illustrated in the conditionalized analyses of 
Experiment 3: Proactive interference was worse for change that was noticed but not later 
recollected. 
One goal of the current experiments was to create situations where the probability of noticing 
and recollection of change could be increased and lead to overall retroactive and proactive 
facilitation. Our earlier articles demonstrating the role of noticing and recollection of change on 
proactive facilitation depended on conditionalized analyses, which were subject to item selection 
explanations. Nonetheless, results from the current experiments converge with results from our 
earlier experiments. Of particular interest, results of the current experiments show that the 
repetition involved in noticing change is responsible for retroactive facilitation. The increased 
memory for the original pair produced by such repetition in combination with recollection of 
change produces proactive facilitation, but serves as a source of heightened interference when 
change is not recollected. 
Our theorizing about the importance of noticing and recollecting change builds on prior work 
done to show the importance of remindings (e.g., Benjamin & Ross, 2010; Hintzman, 
2004). Hintzman (2004) proposed that remindings explain the lack of correspondence between 
effects of manipulations on frequency judgments versus recognition judgments. A general 
“memory strength” view holds that both recognition memory and frequency judgments rely on 
the same mechanism and, so, should be affected by various manipulations in the same way. In 
contrast, Hintzman showed that frequency judgments are more sensitive to effects of number of 
repetitions than is recognition confidence. He proposed that frequency judgments rely upon the 
recursive representation produced when a later presentation reminds one of an earlier 
presentation. Reminding was defined as “spontaneous recall of events related to the stimulus—
particularly, earlier events in the experimental context.” (p. 344) The memory record for a 
reminding embeds the earlier event in the later event. The construct of remindings was used to 
account for a variety of results in the memory literature, including the finding that participants 
can remember the temporal order of related words (e.g., king followed later in the list by queen) 
better than that of unrelated words (Tzeng & Cotton, 1980; Winograd & Soloway, 1985). Their 
ability to do is assumed to depend on recollection at the time of test that queen reminded them 
of king during study, a recollection based on the recursive trace formed during reminding. For a 
reminding to occur, a later presented item must provoke retrieval of memory for the earlier-
presented item and its doing so is dependent upon well-known factors that are important for 
retrieval, including the delay since the encounter with the earlier-presented item and the 
similarity between the related items. In this vein, Hintzman and Stern (1978) found that 
judgments of frequency were higher when the test item had been repeated in the same context 
rather than in varying contexts. As noted by Hintzman (2004), the lack of correspondence 
between effects on different measures of memory is reason to reject theories holding that general 
strength underlies performance on all memory measures, including his own Minerva model. 
Similarly, current results are reason to reject traditional theories of interference that held that 
“associative strength” underlies performance (Postman & Underwood, 1973). 
Recollection of remindings that reflect noticing relationships among events can enhance cued-
recall of semantically related words (Jacoby, 1974), temporal judgments (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 
2013, and list discrimination (Jacoby et al., 2013) as well as turn proactive interference into 
proactive facilitation and retroactive interference into retroactive facilitation. By emphasizing the 
importance of noticing, and by arguing for a consequent recursive representation, we depart from 
the associationistic tradition that marked investigations of retroactive and proactive effects from 
the perspective of the verbal learning tradition. Asch (1969) argued that “association” as used 
within the associationistic tradition referred to an “and” relationship between two events. He 
demonstrated that other forms of relationship were much more effective as a basis for perception 
and for memory. Particularly relevant to results reported in the current article, Asch 
(1969) demonstrated that even repetition benefits in memory depend upon noticing the 
relationship between the prior event and the current event. Participants learned associations 
between pairs of items to criterion and after some intervening tasks, learned a second list that 
included a single critical pair from the first list. During study of the second list, many 
participants remained unaware that one item was a repetition, and took as many trials to learn the 
repeated item as to learn a completely new item. Only when people were aware of the relation 
between initial study and the repetition of an item in the second list did their learning of the item 
in the context of the second list inherit the learning that accrued to the item in the context of the 
first list. These results are often met with disbelief, but we recently replicated them (Komsky, 
Kelley, & Jacoby, in preparation), and found similar results when the critical pair changed 
between lists. Furthermore, in Wahlheim et al. (2014) repetitions of pairs that went unnoticed as 
such showed cued recall that was no better than control items presented once. 
Similarity and Difference in Change Detection 
Reed Hunt and his collaborators have done much research to make the important point that 
precision in memory (distinctiveness) derives from encoding differences in the context of 
similarity (for a review, see Hunt, 2012). We agree that good memory requires preserving 
information about differences against a background of similarity. This can be accomplished by a 
recursive representation of change. Similarity between events is necessary for a current event to 
trigger a reminding of an earlier event. For our experiments, an important basis of similarity was 
the left-hand member of pairs (A-B, A-D). Noticing change relies upon differences with both 
similarities and differences being represented in the recursive trace. One benefit of the 
interpretation of reminding and the recursive representation that embeds memory for the original 
event into the experience and memory of the second event is that such a representation can also 
account for improved memory for temporal order and list membership (Jacoby et al., 2013). 
In line with Hunt’s emphasis on the conditions that give rise to distinctiveness, whether greater 
attention is focused on differences or on similarities likely depends upon the task in which a 
person is engaged as well as the characteristics of the materials. Begg (1978) showed that for 
pairs of words that were similar (e.g., whiskey, vodka) subsequent memory performance was 
better if participants were asked to list differences rather than similarities between the two. In 
contrast, for pairs of words that had little in common, subsequent memory performance was 
better if participants were asked to list similarities. An interesting question is whether the 
recursive trace that results from attempting to detect change would differ from the recursive trace 
that results from attempting to detect similarity even with materials kept constant. Change is 
noticed against a background of similarity and the reminding required for noticing change likely 
reflects the task in which a person is engaged, along with the salience of similarities and 
differences as determined by one’s goals and the materials. 
Depth of Recursive Reminding 
A key parameter in testing whether noticing change and recollection of change extends to other 
paradigms to produce proactive and retroactive facilitation may be the depth of recursion in 
remindings. People may be reminded of an earlier event by a changed event, but will a 
subsequent change lead them to be reminded of being reminded, and then later to being reminded 
of being reminded of being reminded, with a corresponding depth of recursion in the 
remembered representation? Hintzman (2004) proposed that recursive reminding could be quite 
deep, such that it could support frequency judgments in the range (one to three) used in his 
experiments, however, the depth of recursion may differ for repetitions versus changes. 
Jacoby et al. (2001) investigated proactive interference using a training phase during which A-B 
and A-D pairs were intermixed and presented a large number of times so A-B sometimes 
followed A-D and vice versa. This training phase occurred prior to the presentation of study lists 
that were presented to assess effects of proactive interference. The frequent changes in responses 
paired with a cue during training makes it unlikely that recollection of change could be used to 
avoid response competition responsible for proactive interference under those conditions. If 
noticing change results in A-B being embedded in A-D, would representing A-B result in the 
earlier embedded trace being embedded in memory for the later presentation of A-B, and so 
forth? There must be some limit to the depth of such recursion. Beyond that limit, one might 
only recollect that change occurred frequently without being able to recollect the order or even 
which response was encountered most recently. 
When changes in the response paired with a cue are frequent, people’s best chance to reduce 
interference due to response competition may be to constrain retrieval to the targeted context or 
list, rather than relying on recollection of change as in the current experiments. Jacoby et al. 
showed that their results were fit well with the assumption that proactive interference is observed 
only when recollection fails. Jacoby et al. used “recollection” to refer to the process of 
constraining retrieval. In the current experiments, we use “recollection of change” to refer to 
remembering a particular content that can aid retrieval of the target. On a broader level, Jacoby et 
al. and the current results share a common explanation that interference stems from an automatic 
process of competition that prevails when controlled recollection fails to oppose it. 
Given the pivotal role of noticing and recollection of change for transforming potential 
interference into facilitation, it is important to identify conditions that increase the likelihood of 
noticing and recollection of change. Repeated presentation of the original pair makes noticing 
and recollection of change more likely (Wahlheim, 2014; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013) as does a 
test on the responses from the original pairs as compared with representing the original pairs for 
restudy prior to study of List 2 (Wahlheim, 2015). Negley and Kelley (in preparation) 
manipulated the probability of noticing change by varying the background against which pairs 
were presented. Background nature scenes (an eagle in the mountains, a giant wave) were either 
repeated or changed between the A-B and A-D pairs. When scenes were repeated, change in the 
pair was more often noticed, change was more often recollected, and cued recall of the more 
recent pair was improved, compared with when scenes were changed. The finding that noticing 
of change is more likely when background is held constant converges with Hintzman and Stern’s 
(1978) finding that judgments of frequency were higher when the test item had been repeated in 
the same context rather than in varying contexts. 
Spontaneous Reminding Versus Directed Noticing 
Hintzman (2004, 2011) defines remindings as cases of spontaneous retrieval as does Benjamin 
and Ross (2010). Berntsen and colleagues (e.g., Berntsen, Staugaard, & Sorenson, 2013) also 
distinguish between spontaneous retrieval (remindings) and intentional retrieval. Berntsen et al. 
proposed that spontaneous remindings are particularly sensitive to reinstatement of rich context. 
Reinstatement of context is important for remindings (Hintzman & Stern, 1978; Negley & 
Kelley, in preparation), and does seem likely to sometimes give rise to spontaneous reminding. 
However, match in context is also likely to be important for directed reminding as revealed by 
the importance of the match between study and test context for intentional use of memory 
(e.g., Smith & Vela, 2001). It is an empirical question whether spontaneous noticing of 
repetitions, changes and other relationships differs qualitatively from intentional detection and 
whether they respond differently to various manipulations. 
It is likely that results of the current experiments reflected both spontaneous and intentional 
reminding. The probability of recollecting between-list changes in the N-back condition was 
much higher than that in the Within-List Back condition, showing that looking-back instructions 
brought remindings partially under task control. However, the finding that recollection of 
between-list changes in the Within-List Back condition was far greater than zero suggests that 
spontaneous remindings of List 1 responses sometimes occurred during the presentation of List 
2. Spontaneous remindings produced by between-list changes would serve as a source of change 
detection errors for the Within-List Back condition and might also slow correct rejection of 
between-list changes as having occurred in List 2. Such interference effects have been used as a 
measure of automaticity (e.g., Anderson, Jacoby, Thomas, & Balota, 2011). It opens the 
possibility that errors and slowing of correct rejections in looking-back tasks could be used to 
distinguish spontaneous remindings from those that are directed by instructions. For example, 
increasing the number of List 1 presentations of an A-B pair might increase the probability of 
mistakenly accepting between list changes as within list changes, and also slow the rejection of 
between-list changes in the Within-List looking back condition, showing an effect on 
spontaneous noticing of change. Even when one attempts to restrict oneself to examining the 
recent past, one might notice changes from particularly salient original events or find that 
frequently encountered original events spontaneously come to mind. Failures of looking-back 
instructions to fully bring reminding under task control are likely to be informative. 
Individual Differences in Noticing and Recollection of Change 
There are large individual differences in the probability of noticing and recollecting change, and 
individual differences in change recollection substantially contribute to differences in the 
probability of recalling changed responses (Jacoby et al., 2013; Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim & 
Jacoby, 2013). The results produced by the use of the looking-back procedure in the current 
experiments suggest that individual differences in noticing and recollection of change partly 
reflect differences in the breadth of attention. That is, people may differ in the extent to which 
they look back over recent experiences as opposed to focus more narrowly on the current 
situation (cf. Jacoby, 1974). Similarly, in the misinformation effect, which is a case of retroactive 
interference that occurs when the misinformation (changed detail) is not detected as such, there 
are also individual differences. For example, participants who read the misinformation more 
slowly are more likely to notice the changes, and to then not show disruptive effects of the 
misinformation on memory for the original event (Tousignant et al., 1986). The slower reading 
may reflect more looking back to the original event. 
Individual differences in looking back are potentially important in a variety of settings. Otero 
and Kintsch (1992) found that many students failed to detect contradictions between sentences in 
text but the few who did so showed facilitation of memory for both the original and contradicting 
sentences, whereas those who did not recalled one or the other of the contradictory sentences or 
neither. Their findings are similar to ours, and illustrate the general importance of individual 
differences in noticing and recollection of change. People also differ in the extent to which they 
compartmentalize prior knowledge and do not integrate it with current learning (e.g., Potts, 
Keller, & Rooley, 1981). A substantial proportion of people neglect to access general knowledge 
while doing a linear ordering task with a mix of real-world and novel elements (see also, Hannon 
& Daneman, 2001). Integration of prior knowledge in a current learning task may rely on 
noticing relationships and therefore point to the importance of individual differences in looking 
back in educational settings. 
Even when participants are not required to explicitly detect change but, instead, are only 
instructed to learn List 2, we (Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013) have found that recollection of change 
as well as recall of the changed response is high for some participants. Presumably, those 
participants detected change during the presentation of List 2 even though they were not 
instructed to do so, which might involve self testing as well as spontaneous noticing of change. 
Having spontaneously noticed change for one pair, participants might begin to self-test for other 
pairs, seeking further changes. Comparisons of effects of instructions to learn with those 
produced by instructions to explicitly detect change holds promise as a means of further 
examining individual differences in looking back (cf. Jacoby, 1974), as well as a means of 
further exploring the utility of the contrast between spontaneous and directed noticing of change. 
To produce proactive facilitation, detection of change is not sufficient, but in addition, detected 
change must be recollected. As a consequence, overall proactive facilitation will occur only 
under conditions that promote recollection of change as well as detection of change. In this vein, 
detection of change was higher for within-list changes than for between-list changes 
(Experiments 2 and 3), but overall proactive facilitation was observed only for between-list 
changes. This outcome was a consequence of recollection of change being substantially higher 
for between-list changes than for within-list changes. The recollection advantage of between-list 
changes was interpreted as being an effect of the spacing of the original and changed response. 
Similarly, it was noted that the effect of spacing repetitions depends on the detection of 
repetition, which can be manipulated by means of a looking-back procedure (Wahlheim et al., 
2014). 
Conclusions 
A great deal of research and theorizing has been aimed at the effects of repetition. For example, a 
huge literature is devoted to recognition memory. Much less has been done to investigate 
conditions that are important for the noticing and recollection of change. In the current 
experiments, change was arbitrary in that there was little or no association between the original 
and changed responses. Even recollection of arbitrary change produced memory facilitation in a 
situation that could produce interference. In more natural settings, change is typically not 
arbitrary but causal (cf. Hintzman, 2011), which likely results in even larger effects of noticing 
and recollection of change. 
Often, the first step toward adjustment to changed circumstances is to look back so as to notice 
and later recollect change. Recollection of change might serve as an important bridge to guide 
performance in changed circumstances until new automatic influences of memory develop to a 
level that makes recollection of change no longer needed. Further, it is likely that recollection of 
change is generally important for proactive facilitation in the form of learning. As an example, 
suppose one unintentionally changed one’s golf swing and so produced a shot that was strikingly 
superior to that typically produced in similar situations. To incorporate this change into one’s 
standard golf swing, it is seemingly necessary that the change be noticed and subsequently 
recollected prior to later swings in similar circumstances until the changed swing becomes 
habitual due to its repetition. Concerns of this sort highlight the importance of further 
investigating effects of noticing and recollection of change for applied purposes as well as for 
purposes of theory. 
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